The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dominate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or post-bidding spoil-division.
In this paper we construct a family of non-value-bidding equilibria for an English auction that allows inter-bidder resale. Such equilibria exist in any independent private value environment (symmetric or asymmetric) for any number of bidders (Proposition 1). Each equilibrium in this family is identified by the choice of a designated bidder and a threshold type, below which all bidders, except the designated bidder, bid zero. All bidders with types above the threshold bid up to their values. In cases where the designated bidder wins the initial auction and has a sufficiently low type, she will offer the item for resale instead of consuming it. Because the determination of the designated bidder does not depend upon her type and the resale market retains information asymmetry, the final outcome may be inefficient.
Since a designated bidder may win the initial auction at a low price, such equilibria provide an opportunity for a form of tacit collusion among the bidders. By using a publicly observed randomizing device (or sunspot) to choose the designated bidder, the surplus can be distributed in a way that makes every bidder of every type better-off than under the valuebidding equilibrium; i.e., the value-bidding equilibrium is interim (bidder-)Pareto dominated (Proposition 2).
1 The recommendation made by the sunspot device is not binding. Once the sunspot picks a designated bidder, it is in the interest of each bidder to bid accordingly in the initial auction based on the expectation that others will follow their assigned roles.
In previous models of collusion in single-unit standard auctions (cf. Graham and Marshall (1987) , Mailath and Zemsky (1991) , and McAfee and McMillan (1992) ), a bidding ring designates a single member of the ring to participate in the auction and win at a low price, then all members of the bidding ring are supposed to act according to this pre-auction arrangement during the auction. The problem is, if the auction is first-price, Dutch, or allpay, the ring members who are supposed to refrain from competing against the designated bidder have a strict incentive to outbid him. Hence for such auctions, it is necessary to assume that all members of the bidding ring can commit to the pre-auction arrangement
1 Readers who are familiar with U.S. litigation history might draw some parallels between our proposed use of a sunspots variable and the famous phases-of-the-moon bidding ring that was operated by electrical equipment suppliers in the 1950s. However, despite some reports, the phases-of-the-moon scheme earned its designation because it involved an explicit two-week rotation to determine the low bidder. While it perhaps could have been, bidding was not actually determined by the phase of the moon. See Smith (1961) .
during the auction. Since bidding rings are illegal, this commitment assumption is hard to justify.
If the auction is English or second-price, this commitment assumption can be dispensed with, as it may be a best response for a designated "loser" to not outbid the designated bidder, who is expected to bid above all other ring members' values. However, two other problems arise. First, without resale, non-value bidding in the English or second-price auction is weakly dominated. Second, if the designated bidder is chosen efficiently, i.e., only a bidder with the highest value in the bidding ring is designated, as in Marshall and Marx (2007) , then the side transfers needed to incentivize the identification of such a designated bidder cannot satisfy the ex post budget balancing condition within the bidding ring. That is because, without resale, the pre-auction arrangement has to be ex post incentive compatible among the colluders (otherwise we would need to keep the commitment assumption), but then the budget problem arises because ex post efficiency, ex post incentive compatibility, and ex post budget balancing cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
2 Hence, the bidding ring would need an intermediary to inject funds into the ring at some times and extract funds from it at other times, which is hard to arrange given the required covertness of collusion.
To rationalize collusion in a single-unit English or second-price auction without resale, the only way out of the commitment assumption is to choose the designated bidder inefficiently. This is done in the Bayesian Nash equilibria that Blume and Heidhues (2004) completely characterize for the second-price auction with three or more bidders. However, these equilibria have the aforementioned problem of using dominated strategies. In addition, in some environments high-value bidders strictly prefer the value-bidding equilibrium to all of these equilibria even if we give everyone a chance to be the designated bidder through sunspot coordination; we show this is true for all symmetric environments with strictly concave value distributions (Proposition 3).
By introducing the possibility of resale, our paper resolves many of the problems associ-2 Marshall and Marx (2007) also construct a collusive scheme that satisfies the ex post budget balancing condition, but some ring members who are not the designated bidder also have to deliver payments. Since resale is assumed impossible, these ring members will get nothing in return for their side payments. Thus, without the commitment assumption, they would rather not make their payments. The same problem occurs in the efficient partnership dissolution mechanism of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) .
ated with the previously mentioned collusive schemes. No player is able to commit, before the auction, to what she will do in the auction or at resale. The winner of the auction simply chooses a resale mechanism that is optimal for her given the posterior beliefs after the auction, and only after the initial auction has ended can she commit to the rules of her resale mechanism.
3 Our equilibria do not involve weakly dominated strategies (Appendix B). From the perspective before the designated bidder is picked, every type of every bidder can be made strictly better off than under the value-bidding equilibrium.
Our collusive equilibria are not efficient, but bidders' gains relative to value-bidding can be substantial (Table 1 , Section 5). Moreover, these gains come with less risk of prosecution for illegal activities than the efficient collusive mechanisms, which require commitment devices or a budget-balancing intermediary. From the viewpoint of antitrust authorities, inefficient collusive equilibria are important precisely because of the distortion (Lopomo, Marshall and Marx, 2005) ; efficient collusion involves merely a pure transfer from the seller to the bidders.
In contrast to much of the earlier literature on auctions with resale, our model allows for any number of asymmetric bidders. With multiple bidders at the resale stage, the optimal resale mechanism typically is no longer a take-it-or-leave offer, as often assumed, but is an optimal auction as derived by Myerson (1981) . A technical novelty of our paper is that we avoid complicated explicit computations of bidders' resale payoffs. We identify several structural properties of the resale continuation game that facilitate our perfect Bayesian equilibria for the entire auction-with-resale game. These structural properties do not appear to be specific to the Myerson optimal auction, suggesting that our qualitative results extend to other forms of the resale market.
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Our result that the value-bidding equilibrium is interim (bidder-)Pareto dominated is based on two regularity properties of resale that are satisfied in our equilibria. The properties 3 Lopomo, Marshall and Marx (2005) consider post-auction reallocations within a bidding ring, but the reallocations are decided by a post-auction mechanism that is committed to before the initial auction. 4 For instance, the period-2 seller may be restricted to use a second-price or English auction with an optimal reserve price, or the period-2 seller may use an English auction with the right to reject all bids (Haile, 2003) , or, in two-bidder environments, a random draw may specify which bidder has the right to propose a resale price (Calzolari and Pavan, 2006) .
ensure that, even when the threshold is arbitrarily close to zero, a non-vanishing fraction of the bidder-types below the threshold still engage in actual resale trade. The proof begins with the observation that our equilibria interim Pareto dominate the value-bidding equilibrium if the prior type distributions are uniform. Then we extend this dominance relation to arbitrary type distributions provided that the thresholds in our equilibria are sufficiently small. Sufficiently small thresholds allow us to approximate the expected payoffs by the ones in the uniform-distribution case. The aforementioned regularity properties imply that a bidder's gain from trade at resale outweighs the error of the approximation.
The threshold-bidding strategies in our equilibria are built upon Garratt and Tröger (2006) for English and second-price auctions. However, there are nontrivial differences. In Garratt and Tröger, the bidder who will become the reseller has no private information, and the other bidders have identical prior value distributions. In contrast, in this paper every bidder has private information and bidders' value-distributions can differ. Our extension of the equilibrium construction to the case of asymmetric bidders is made possible by conditioning the designated bidder's bid on the identities of the bidders who stay in the auction. This information is not available in a sealed-bid format. Hence, in environments with three or more bidders our equilibrium construction applies to second-price auctions only under an additional symmetry assumption (Remark 3).
Recent works by Lebrun (2007) and Hafalir and Krishna (2007) compare revenue in first-and second-price auctions with resale in 2-bidder models. Hafalir and Krishna show that in a 2-bidder asymmetric model there exists a "general revenue ranking" in favor of first-price auctions, provided bidders play the value-bidding equilibrium in the second-price auction. Lebrun shows that, depending on the selected equilibria, this ranking does not necessarily hold when behavior (mixed) strategies are allowed. Our construction of equilibria for second-price auctions that interim Pareto-dominate value bidding does not challenge the revenue ranking established by Hafalir and Krishna. Because the value-bidding equilibrium is efficient, it yields a seller revenue that is necessarily greater than in any interim Paretodominating equilibrium.
Collusive equilibria have been constructed for multi-unit auctions by Milgrom (2000) , Brusco and Lopomo (2002) 
Model
We consider environments with n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders pursuing a single indivisible private good. Bidder i ∈ N := {1, . . . , n} has a privately known use value, or type,
, for the good. The type space is denoted by
6 From the viewpoint of the other bidders, t i is independently distributed according to a probability distribution with cumulative distribution function F i , called prior belief , with support T i and Lipschitz continuous positive density f i . We consider a 2-period interaction, which begins after each bidder i has privately observed her use value t i .
In period 1, the good is offered via an English auction that is modelled as in Milgrom and Weber (1982) . The auctioneer continuously raises the current price beginning at 0.
Remark 1 extends the equilibrium construction to an English auction that starts at a positive price). Initially, all bidders are "in" or "active". As the current price rises, each bidder can irreversibly "drop out" at any point. When somebody drops out, other bidders may react by dropping out at the same price. Dropout decisions are publicly observed. The auction ends at the first current price where at most one bidder is active. The ending current price is called the auction price. If one bidder is active at the end, this is the auction winner; if all active bidders drop out at the auction price, there is a tie among the previously active bidders, and any tieing bidder becomes the winner with equal probability.
The auction winner either consumes the good in period 1, thereby ending the game, or becomes the period-2 seller . The period-2 seller proposes a sales mechanism to the losing bidders, called period-2 buyers. A sales mechanism is any game form to be played by the period-2 buyers. The mechanism is played if it is accepted by all period-2 buyers; otherwise 5 Pagnozzi (2007) analyzes multi-unit auctions with resale in a complete information model. 6 We shall use boldface letters to denote multidimensional quantities.
the resale seller consumes the good in period 2. 7 Observe that the period-2 seller faces no restrictions: she can choose an arbitrary sales mechanism. No bidder can pre-commit in period 1 to use a particular mechanism in period 2.
Every bidder's discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1]. From the viewpoint of period 1, the payoff of type t i of bidder i is t i (q 1 + δq 2 ) − p 1 − δp 2 , where q k (k = 1, 2) denotes the probability of her consuming the good in period k, and p k denotes her net expected monetary payment in period k. From the viewpoint of period 2, the bidders only care about their period-2 payments and period-2 allocation probabilities.
Histories, strategies, beliefs, and period-2 outcome
A non-terminal history lists the observed dropout decisions and the current price at any point before the period-1 auction ends. The set of non-terminal histories where bidder i ∈ N is active is denoted H i . A terminal history lists the observed dropout decisions up to the end of the auction, the auction price, and the winner. The set of terminal histories is denoted
A bidding strategy profile (β i (· | h)) i∈N,h∈H i determines, for any bidder i ∈ N , any history h ∈ H i and any type t i ∈ T i , the current price b = β i (t i | h) at which bidder i plans to drop out. We call b the bid of type t i of bidder i at h. If b is smaller than or equal to the current price at h, then b is interpreted as dropping out immediately at h. Observe that, if at h a bidder = i bids b < b, then the plan to drop out at b becomes irrelevant once the current price b is reached.
A resale decision profile is a vector (γ h ) h∈Hterm , where γ h (t) = resale if type t of the winner offers the good for resale at the terminal history h, and γ h (t) = consume if the winner consumes the good in period 1. A period-1 belief profile (A h ) h∈H assigns to each history h a probability distribution A h on T that represents the (common) belief at h about the bidders' types. A period-2 belief profile (G h ) h∈Hterm assigns to each h a probability distribution G h on T that represents the (common) belief about the bidders' types if the winner offers the 7 We assume that there is no further resale after the re-seller's resale mechanism. However, for certain prior value distributions, this assumption can be weakened to allow the winner of the resale mechanism to offer further resaleà la Zheng (2002) .
good for resale, given the terminal history h.
Using the revelation principle, we can describe a period-2 outcome as a vector (P i (t), Q i (t)) i∈N, t∈T such that, for any bidder i and type profile t ∈ T, the number P i (t) denotes the expected net period-2 monetary transfer of bidder i, and Q i (t) denotes the probability that bidder i consumes the good in period 2, where k∈N Q k (t) = 1 and k∈N P k (t) = 0.
The equilibrium concept
An equilibrium consists of a bidding profile (β i (· | h)) i∈N,h∈H i , a resale-decision profile (γ h ) h∈Hterm , a period-1 belief profile (A h ) h∈H , a period-2 belief profile (G h ) h∈Hterm , and a family of period-2 outcomes (P i,h (t), Q i,h (t)) i∈N, t∈T, h∈Hterm with the following properties:
a. for all h ∈ H term , the period-2 outcome (P i,h (t), Q i,h (t)) i∈N, t∈T is induced by a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the period-2 continuation game, given the period-2 seller from terminal history h and the (commonly known) period-2 belief G h ;
b. the period-1 belief profile (A h ) h∈H obeys Bayes' rule with respect to the bidding profile
c. for all h ∈ H term , j ∈ N , and t j ∈ T j , if bidder j with type t j is the period-1 winner at history h, then γ h (t j ) = resale (resp., consume) if t j is strictly smaller (resp., greater) than j's discounted period-2 payoff, given the period-2 belief G h and the expected period-2 outcome (P i,h (t), Q i,h (t)) i∈N, t∈T ;
d. the period-2 belief profile (G h ) h∈H obeys Bayes' rule with respect to the period-1 belief profile (A h ) h∈H and the resale-decision profile (γ h ) h∈Hterm ; e. for all i ∈ N , t i ∈ T i , and h ∈ H i , the bid β i (t i | h) maximizes the expected payoff of type t i of bidder i at the history h, given the belief A h , provided that everyone else abides to the bidding profile, bidder i abides to her bidding strategy after additional bidders drop out, and that the resale-decision profile and family of period-2 outcomes are implemented.
We construct equilibria where period-1 beliefs and period-2 beliefs are stochastically independent across bidders, and where any belief about bidder i's (i ∈ N ) type is derived from the prior belief and the information that her type lies in a (possibly degenerate) interval
any belief with an element of J . That is, we will treat J variably as a product of intervals or as a cumulative distribution function on T, and will treat J i variably as an interval or a cumulative distribution function on T i .
The period-2 continuation game
In view of equilibrium condition (a), we select a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the period-2 continuation game for any period-2 seller j ∈ N and any belief
We use a well-known selection: the mechanism proposed by the period-2 seller is Myerson's (1981) auction that is optimal for period-2 seller j based on period-2 belief profile J,
given the assumption that resale after period 2 is impossible. 8 Denote the period-2 outcome implemented by this auction by (P j,J i (t), Q j,J i (t)) i∈N, t∈T for any (j, J) specified above.
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Notation is needed to describe the properties of the Myerson optimal auction outcome that are used in the following analysis. For all i ∈ N , let J −i = k =i J k denote the marginal distribution induced by J on T −i := k =i T k . The probability that type t i ∈ T i of bidder i consumes the good in period 2 (by keeping it if i = j and obtaining it if i = j) is denoted
and her period-2 expected payoff is denoted
8 Our period-2 environment differs from Myerson's environment insofar as the period-2 seller may be privately informed about her type. This plays no role because by assumption the period-2 seller is not a player in her sales mechanism, so that the period-2 buyers' beliefs about the seller's type have no impact on their behavior. If we did allow mechanisms where the period-2 seller is a player, the Myerson optimal auction outcome would still be a "strong solution" defined by Myerson (1983) ; see Mylovanov and Tröger (2008) . 9 Observe that the period-2 outcome includes payments and allocation probabilities for types not in J.
The period-2 seller believes that types t i ∈ J i occur with probability 0. We assume that any type t i > sup J i obtains the good with the same probability as type sup J i , and any type t i < inf J i obtains the good with probability 0.
For the period-2 seller we will use the shortcuts q j (t j , J) = q jj (t j , J) and w j (t j , J) = l jj (t j , J).
A well-known implication of the incentive compatibility of the period-2 outcome, proved via the envelope theorem in integral form (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) , are the following envelope formulas: for all t i , t i ∈ T i (t i < t i ) and t j , t j ∈ T j (t j < t j ),
Period-2 payments can be defined such that the ex-post participation conditions are satisfied:
for all t ∈ T, j ∈ N , and i = j,
If there are expected gains from trade between the period-2 seller and all buyers, then by using an optimal auction the period-2 seller j captures a nonzero share of the gains: for all
A further straightforward property of the Myerson optimal auction outcome is that the period-2 seller's period-2 payoff is continuous in the period-2 belief about her type (in fact, the payoff is independent of the belief). To state this property, let [0, x] × J −j denote the belief that bidder j's type is at most x and other bidders' types are in J −j . For all j ∈ N , t j ∈ T j , and J ∈ J , the map
The next property-that a bidder's period-2 payoff as a buyer is never larger than as a seller-follows from the fact that the bidder's type is a lower bound for her period-2 payoff as a seller and an upper bound for her period-2 payoff as a buyer. For all i ∈ N , t i ∈ T i , j ∈ N \ {i}, and J ∈ J ,
The next relevant property of the Myerson optimal auction outcome is proved in Appendix A: each bidder as a period-2 seller consumes the good with a weakly higher probability than obtaining it as a period-2 buyer, given the same period-2 beliefs.
Lemma 1 Let i ∈ N , t i ∈ T i , j ∈ N \ {i}, and J ∈ J . Then
Our equilibrium construction in the next section applies to any resale market that satisfies
properties (1)- (8). None of these properties appears specific to the Myerson optimal auction outcome. In particular, (5) simply reflects the facts that the period-2 seller has some bargaining power and there is some resale trade. Property (7) is implied by (3)-(4) if n = 2; otherwise (7) essentially provides an upper bound on an auction loser's ability to extract rents if two other bidders trade the good in period 2. Property (8) reflects the basic intuition that private information leads to less trade than efficiency requires.
Equilibria for English auctions with resale
In this section, we construct a family of equilibria for the English auction with resale. In each equilibrium, one of the bidders, say bidder 1, is commonly known to be the designated bidder of the period-1 auction. Bidding strategies depend upon a threshold t * , which can take on any value in the interval (0, min i∈N t i ]. Every bidder with type above t * bids her own type. All designated-bidder types below t * bid more than 0 and not more than t * . Any other bidder with a type below t * drops out at the beginning of the auction. If someone with type above t * wins, resale does not occur. Otherwise, the designated bidder wins at price 0; if her type is sufficiently low, she offers the good for resale in period 2 according to a continuation equilibrium described in Section 3. Since the selection of the designated bidder does not depend upon her type and informational asymmetries remain at resale, these equilibria are inefficient, contrary to the value-bidding equilibrium of English auctions.
10 specify the period-1 strategy for bidder 1. First, we establish that bidder 1's resale decision is defined by a non-zero cutoff (Lemma 2) such that lower types of bidder 1 prefer offering resale to immediate consumption, and higher types have the reverse preference. Second, for each bidder i = 1 we define a price at which type t * is indifferent between winning the period-1 auction and waiting for resale, and we show that these prices are strictly positive (Lemma 3). These prices become the bids for all types below t * of bidder 1 who offer resale.
Fix a threshold t
n−1 denote the belief resulting from the prior belief and the information that bidder 1's type is below x and the other bidders' types are below t * .
If the period-2 belief is J * t * , then a period-2 buyer's highest possible use value is t * , so that types just below t * of bidder 1 prefer consuming the good in period 1 to offering resale in period 2 if period-2 payoffs are discounted (δ < 1). To find a cutoff type between consumption and offering resale, let
Observe that τ * < t * , because by (3)-(5) the set in (9) contains a type below t * . We define
For all bidders i = 1, let b * i denote the price that makes type t * of bidder i indifferent between (i) winning the auction at price b
The bidding strategy for designated-bidder types below t * is as follows. If her type is below τ * , then at any history h ∈ H 1 she bids max i∈S 1 (h) b * i , where S 1 (h) denotes the set of bidders other than 1 who are active at the history h; and she will offer resale if she wins. If her type is between τ * and t * , then she bids t * and she does not offer resale if she wins.
Proposition 1 For any threshold t * , there exists an equilibrium with properties (i)-(iv).
(i) For any history h ∈ H 1 , type t 1 ∈ T 1 of bidder 1 bids the maximum of the current price and
(ii) For all bidders i = 1 and any history h ∈ H i , type t i ∈ T i of bidder i bids the maximum of the current price and
(15) (iii) Letĥ ∈ H term denote the history where all bidders other than bidder 1 have dropped out at the beginning of the auction. Bidder 1's resale decision at historyĥ is
(iv) At historyĥ, the period-2 outcome is the Myerson optimal auction outcome given the period-2 seller 1 and the period-2 belief [0,
Any equilibrium that satisfies properties (i)-(iv) is called a t * -equilibrium.
Proposition 1 is proved in Appendix A. Here we explain heuristically why a bidder i = 1, who is not the designated bidder, would abide by the equilibrium strategy of dropping out of the auction when his type is below the threshold t * . Bidder i can deviate in at least two ways. He can either try to outbid the designated bidder (bidder 1) and consume the good upon winning it. Or he can try to outbid bidder 1 and offer resale upon winning.
To explain why both kinds of deviation are unprofitable, let us suppose that every other bidder's type is below t * . Otherwise, someone else is bidding above bidder i's use value and bidder i's deviation does not increase his payoff on the equilibrium path.
If bidder i manages to outbid bidder 1 and consumes the good upon winning, then bidder i's payoff is equal to t i − b * i , as the low-type bidder 1 bids up to b * i against bidder i and everyone else, low-type and obedient, quits at zero price. This payoff is represented by the slope-1 straight line, labeled X, in Figure 1 . An important point is that curve Y is less steep than line X, so that bidder i with types below t * prefers Y (abiding by the equilibrium and waiting for resale) to X (outbidding bidder 1 and consuming the good). That follows from the envelope formula (1): When t i changes from t * , the payoff from X, t i − b i (t * ), changes at the rate one while the payoff
good for resale upon winning. If bidder i manages to do that, his role in period 2 is switched from a bidder to a seller, and the post-auction beliefs J * τ * are unchanged. His expected payoff at the start of period 2 will be equal to w i (t i , J * τ * ), so his present expected payoff from such deviation is equal to
This payoff is represented by the curve labeled as Z in Figure 1 . Note that the position of the curve for t i ≥ t * is lower than that of line X. That is because a reseller whose type is above t * cannot profit from resale, since everyone else's type is below t * . Thus, this part of curve Z coincides with the corresponding part of X if there is no discounting, and it lies below X if there is discounting.
A crucial observation is that, for t i < t * , the curve Z is steeper than the curve Y . As Z is below Y at t * , that means Z is always below Y for types below t * , i.e., bidder i with types below t * would rather be a period-2 buyer than a period-2 seller. To show this relationship between the slopes, recall the definition of b i (t * ) given in (13). We have
By the envelope formulae (1)- (2),
, decreases from the level Z * faster than the expected payoff from Y ,
We provide some remarks on Proposition 1.
Remark 1. Proposition 1 can be extended to the case where the English auction in period 1 has a reserve price r > 0. Amend the English auction as follows. The auction starts with a current price lower than r (say zero price) that corresponds to "no sale." If someone drops out at no-sale, then the price clock pauses to give others a chance to drop out. Once no more bidders drop out at no-sale, the price clock jumps to the reserve price r.
An equilibrium can be constructed for any threshold t * > r, provided the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1. Lett ∈ T 1 be the type of bidder 1 such that her expected payoff (for the entire auction-resale game) is zero if she wins the good at price r and offers the good for resale, given the belief that the types in [0, t * ] of other bidders participate in the resale market. Suppose δ is sufficiently close to 1, so thatt < r. According to the equilibrium, bidder 1 drops out at "no sale" if and only if her type is belowt. Once bidder 1 has dropped out at no-sale, other bidders play the value-bidding equilibrium; if bidder 1 does not drop out at no-sale, then the bidders' subsequent actions are analogous to the equilibria described in Proposition 1, where "dropping out at zero price" is replaced by "dropping out at nosale." Resale occurs given the belief that (i) bidder 1's type is distributed on [t, τ ] for some τ ∈ (r, t * ), and (ii) the other bidders' types are distributed on [0, t * ].
Remark 2. The t * -equilibrium construction makes essential use of the transparent dynamic nature of an English auction, because the designated bidder's dropout price depends on the set of the other bidders who have not dropped out (the upper branch of (14)). This dependence is important in our construction because by (13), bidders drawn from different distributions need different prices b * i to be kept obedient to the threshold t * . For exactly this reason, the t * -equilibrium construction does not generally extend to second-price auctions.
The construction does extend if b * 2 = · · · = b * n , which holds if bidders 2 to n are ex ante symmetric.
Remark 3. The t * -equilibria are not the only equilibria that differ from the value-bidding equilibrium. There also exist "extreme equilibria" where bidder 1's bid is so high that all types of all other bidders find it optimal to drop out at the beginning of the auction.
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Extreme equilibria are conceptually simpler than t * -equilibria, however there are practical reasons why extreme equilibria might not be played. First, in an extreme equilibrium, the good is always sold at zero price at the initial auction. That would make a regulator suspicious of collusion, which the bidders may want to avoid. Second, if low-type bidders have a budget constraint that prevents them from staying active up to very high prices, then a designated bidder's bidding strategy in an extreme equilibrium is not credible. 12 Third, extreme equilibria cannot generally be used to obtain the interim Pareto dominance property described below (see Section 5.1 for an example).
Remark 4. One may drop the assumption that the period-2 seller can prevent further resale transactions. Suppose that, beginning with the period-2 seller, each current owner of the good designs a sales mechanism, given that the next owner will design her own sales mechanism, and so on. This amounts to using Zheng's (2002) (8) hold for the repeated-resale market for a larger class of prior beliefs, but proving this hinges on first solving Zheng's repeated-resale game for the corresponding beliefs.
The interim Pareto dominance of collusion
We assume that a sunspot (à la Shell, 1977 and Cass and Shell, 1983) with n equally likely states is commonly observed before the period-1 auction starts (and after the bidders have been privately informed). This extends the game so that actions can depend on the realization of the sunspot state. Given any strategy profile, the payoff of any type of a given bidder is defined via the expectation over the n sunspot states. We call an equilibrium in the extended game Pareto improving if it interim-Pareto-dominates the value-bidding 12 Brusco and Lopomo (2006) made this point previously in a no-resale model. 13 Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming) characterize the class of beliefs such that Zheng's construction applies.
equilibrium, that is, if every type of every bidder is strictly better-off than in the valuebidding equilibrium. We show that Pareto improving equilibria exist in any environment.
For any threshold t * , we define a t * -collusive equilibrium: if the realized state is j = 1, . . . , n, then a t * -equilibrium is played, with bidder j taking the role of the designated bidder. Clearly this constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The t * -collusive equilibria are Pareto improving for all t * sufficiently close to 0.
Note the generality of this result. A Pareto improving equilibrium exists in any symmetric or asymmetric environment; in particular, strong bidders can gain from colluding with weak bidders. Moreover, the discount factor does not have to be close to 1; the result applies to any non-zero discount factor.
The proof of Proposition 2 utilizes two regularity properties of the period-2 outcome when the period-2 belief is concentrated on types close to 0. These properties, which are stated in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, do not appear to be specific to the Myerson optimal auction outcome; the conclusion of Proposition 2 holds for any resale market outcome that satisfies these properties.
The first step towards the proof of Proposition 2 is to observe that it is sufficient to focus the payoff comparison on the types in the interval [0, t * ].
Lemma 4 If in a t * -collusive equilibrium, type t * of a given bidder is strictly better-off than in the value-bidding equilibrium, then all types above t * of this bidder are strictly better-off.
Proof. Consider any type t i ≥ t * of a bidder i ∈ N . Her payoff in the t * -collusive equilibrium can be different from her value-bidding equilibrium payoff only in the event that the highest type among the other bidders t
−i ≤ t * . Then bidder i's payoff in the t * -collusive equilibrium is t i − n−1 n b * i , and her payoff in the value-bidding equilibrium is t i − t
−i . The payoff difference is independent of t i .
The idea behind using t * close to 0 in Proposition 2 is to make the interval of relevant types [0, t * ] small, so that approximations of payoff comparisons can be obtained using first-order Taylor expansions of the prior distributions,
where
The Taylor expansions (17) are exact (h i (x) = 0) if the priors are (possibly asymmetric) uniform distributions. The uniform-priors example captures the rough idea why Proposition 2 is correct. In the value-bidding equilibrium with uniform priors, it is well-known that the payoff of type t i ≤ t * of bidder i is
For the t * -collusive equilibrium payoff with uniform priors, denoted U * ,uniform i (t i ), we obtain a lower bound by not counting the gains from resale trade:
because with probability 1/n bidder i is the designated bidder, in which case she gets the good for free if all others have valuations below t * . Clearly, (18) and (19) imply
The strict inequality in (20) also holds at t i = 0 and t i = t * , because in a t * -collusive equilibrium type 0 makes a profit as a period-2 seller with positive probability, and type t * gets an information rent as a period-2 buyer with positive probability. Thus, in the uniform-priors example, t * -collusive equilibria are Pareto improving for all t * . Using the Taylor expansion (17), we generalize this result to arbitrary prior distributions and small t * , via several lemmas that are proved in Appendix A.
For all i ∈ N , let τ * i be defined analogously to τ * , with bidder i instead of bidder 1 taking the designated-bidder role. Lemma 5 states that, for small t * , a non-vanishing fraction of the designated-bidder types below t * offer the good for resale on the equilibrium path of a t * -equilibrium.
Lemma 5 There exists 0 < θ < 1 such that, for all t * sufficiently close to 0,
to [0, t * ], is free to make a take-it-or-leave-it fixed-price offer at t * /2 to any buyer. This lower bound on what the period-2 seller can achieve ensures that all types that are sufficiently small relative to t * offer resale, thus bounding τ * i from below.
For all i ∈ N , let J * i denote the belief resulting from the prior belief and the information that bidder i's type is below τ * i and the other bidders' types are below t * . Lemma 6 states that, given the period-2 belief J * i for any small t * , a non-vanishing fraction of the period-2-buyer types below t * buy the good with a non-vanishing probability; if δ = 1, the probability is conditional on the seller's type being below t * .
Lemma 6 There exist 0 < ξ < 1 and > 0 such that, for all t * sufficiently close to 0,
The intuition behind this result is that, because the conclusion (22) holds for any t * in the uniform-priors example, one can use the Taylor expansion (17) to show the conclusion for arbitrary priors and small t * . The proof uses the assumption that the prior densities are Lipschitz continuous. This implies that the virtual valuation functions (Myerson, 1981) for the period-2 beliefs about the period-2 buyers' types are strictly increasing if t * is small.
According to the Myerson optimal auction outcome, the good is then resold to the period-2 buyer with the highest virtual valuation, unless the period-2 seller's type is higher. This allocation rule yields explicit formulas for the buyer-allocation probabilities q ij (t i , J * j ). The lower bound (22) is obtained via approximations for the virtual valuation functions that are obtained using (17).
The next lemma provides an approximation result for payoffs in the value-bidding equilibrium.
14 Lemma 7 The payoff of type t i ≤ t * of bidder i ∈ N in the value-bidding equilibrium is
14 For any k ≥ 0, we will use O((t * ) k ) to denote any function h(x, t * ) (or h(t, t * ) or h(t i , t * )) such that
The next lemma states that, given the period-2 belief J * i for any small t * , a non-vanishing fraction of the period-2-seller types below t * sell the good with a non-vanishing probability.
Lemma 8 Let θ be as in Lemma 5. There exist 0 < ξ < θ and > 0 such that, for all t * sufficiently close to 0,
To prove this, we observe that the upper bound (23) follows from the lower bound (22) because buyer-and seller-allocation probabilities add up to 1 in expectation over all types.
Let U b ij (t i ) denote the payoff of type t i ≤ t * of bidder i ∈ N in a t * -equilibrium where j = i is the designated bidder. Using the lower bound on the trading probability (22) and the envelope formula (1), we obtain a lower bound for her payoff.
Lemma 9 Let ξ and be as in Lemma 6. For all sufficiently small t * and
Let U s i (t i ) denote the payoff of type t i ≤ t * of bidder i ∈ N in a t * -equilibrium where i is the designated bidder. Using the upper bound on the no-trade probability (23) and the envelope formula (2), we obtain a lower bound for her payoff.
Lemma 10 Let ξ and be as in Lemma 8. For all sufficiently small t * and t i ∈ [0, t * ],
Let U * i (t i ) denote the payoff of type t i ≤ t * of bidder i ∈ N in a t * -collusive equilibrium.
Combining Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, we get, for all sufficiently small t * and t i ∈ [0, t * ],
Because g(0) > 0, g(1) > 1/n, and x > x n if 0 < x < 1,
Hence, combining (26) with Lemma 7,
Hence, for sufficiently small t * ,
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
We provide some remarks on Proposition 2:
Remark 5. The uniform-priors example shows that the gains to playing a Pareto improving equilibrium can be quite large. Table 1 shows the gains to a bidder with type t * = .9 in an environment with F i (i ∈ N ) uniform on [0, 1], for various numbers of bidders n. The gains to type t * are the minimum gains over all types in this example. Table 1 : F i (t) = t, t * = .9
Remark 6. Proposition 2 extends to an English auction with a small reserve price. This follows from Remark 1, by continuity. For larger reserve prices r, the question is whether bidders can collude so that the payoff of any bidder-type above r is larger than in the valuebidding equilibrium with reserve price r (where bidders with types below r abstain). We have three results for environments where the prior beliefs F i (i ∈ N ) are uniform on [0, 1].
First, if n = 2, then a Pareto improving equilibrium exists for any reserve price below 1.
Second, if n ≥ 4, then a Pareto improving equilibrium exists if the optimal reserve price under value-bidding, 1/2, is used. Third, a Pareto improving equilibrium exists for any reserve price arbitrarily close to 1 if n is sufficiently large.
Proposition 2 establishes that the bidders can always achieve some, possibly small, Pareto 
We construct a distribution F such that (27) holds. F is piecewise linear with a single kink at some point α ∈ (0, 1/3). We compute an explicit solution for the resale price function p * .
This allows us to verify (27). For all
t ∈ [0, 1], let 17 F (t) :=    1−α α t if 0 ≤ t ≤ α, 1 − α + α 1−α (t − α) if α ≤ t ≤ 1.
Straightforward calculations show that E[t] = α.
Let t ∈ (0, 1). To find the optimal resale price p * (t) for a type-t seller, observe that
Suppose that p * (t) < α. Because p * (t) > t > 0, the first-order condition
holds. This implies p
. Using p * (t) < α we find
Comparing the payoff obtained from p * (t) with the payoff obtained from the price p =
(1 + t)/2 contradicts the optimality of p * (t):
Hence, p * (t) ∈ [α, 1]. For all p ∈ (α, 1),
17 To simplify the exposition, the example uses a distribution with a discontinuous density. There exists an approximating distribution with a Lipschitz continuous density such that the conclusion of the example still holds. In fact, the conclusion holds for any distribution function on [0, 1] that is sufficiently close, in the L 1 -topology on densities, to the distribution in the example. This follows from Berge's Theorem of Maximum because in the example all non-zero types have a unique optimal resale price.
Because π(·, t) is strictly concave on [α, 1], the first-order condition 0 = (∂/∂p)π(p, t) implies p * (t) = 1 + t 2 .
Now (27) follows because
In this example, even though the 1-collusive equilibrium does not Pareto dominate valuebidding, a Pareto dominating t * -collusive equilibrium still exists by Proposition 1.
There may be no Pareto improvement without resale
As pointed out by Blume and Heidhues (2004) , the second-price auction without resale has equilibria (in dominated strategies) with bidding profiles similar to our t * -equilibria. Given any t * ≥ 0, there exists a no-resale t * -equilibrium in which bidders whose use values are above t * bid their use values, all bidders except a designated bidder bid 0 if their use values are below t * , and the designated bidder bids t * if her use value is below t * . These equilibria remain valid if the second-price auction is replaced by the English auction. In fact, bidding in any of our t * -equilibria converges to the no-resale t * -equilibrium with designated bidder 1 in the limit δ → 0 because τ * → 0.
Is it possible to construct a Pareto improving equilibrium without resale based on the no-resale t * -equilibria, using a sunspot as in the model with resale? In many environments it is not possible because high-type bidders are better off with value-bidding. To state this result, label the no-resale t * -equilibrium with designated bidder i by (i, t * ) ∈ N × IR + .
For any probability distribution D on N × IR + , call the equilibrium obtained by playing a no-resale equilibrium according to the distribution D a no-resale collusive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the prior belief is strictly concave and identical for all bidders.
Then in any no-resale collusive equilibrium there exists a bidder, the highest possible type of which, is strictly worse off than in the value-bidding equilibrium.
Proof. Let F = F i (i ∈ N ) denote the prior belief. Let t denote the highest possible type. Let u val denote the payoff of type t in the value-bidding equilibrium. For any no-resale equilibrium (i, t * ) ∈ N × IR + and any k ∈ N , let u i,t * k denote the payoff of type t of bidder k.
We first show that
Because the designated bidder gets the good for free if all others have types below t * ,
It is well-known that
Strict concavity of F implies
Therefore,
In a no-resale collusive equilibrium based on a probability distribution D, the payoff of
Suppose that the highest possible type of each bidder is at least as well off as in the value-
< u val , a contradiction.
The proof works by showing that, in any no-resale collusive equilibrium, the payoff of the highest type averaged over all bidders, is smaller than her value-bidding payoff. Hence, somebody must be worse off in any no-resale collusive equilibrium. Of course, by continuity, the result can be extended to types close to the highest possible type. Blume and Heidhues (2004) show that in environments where the priors (F i ) i∈N have a common support and there are at least three bidders, the no-resale t * -equilibria, with t * ranging in [0, max i∈Nti ], are the only equilibria of the second-price auction without resale.
18
Thus, the set of no-resale collusive equilibria span all of the possible equilibrium utility profiles in this environment. Hence we have the following additional result.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the prior belief is strictly concave and identical for all of the n ≥ 3 bidders. Then, assuming no resale, the value-bidding equilibrium of the second-price auction is not Pareto dominated by any equilibrium of the second-price auction with a public randomization device.
6 Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1. From Myerson (1981, p. 68-69) , there exist weakly increasing functions c i : T i → IR (i ∈ N ) such that, given any type profile t ∈ T, the period-2 seller j ∈ N optimally assigns the good with equal probability to any one of the buyers in the set {i ∈ N \ {j} | t j < c i (t i ) = max and consumes the good if the set is empty. Hence, for all i ∈ N , t i ∈ T i , and j ∈ N \ {i},
where (t 1 , . . . ,t n ) denotes a random vector with distribution J. Similarly,
18 They also show that with any positive reserve price only the value-bidding equilibrium (t * = 0) remains. This is in contrast to the "with resale" case where t * -equilibria with t * > 0 are robust to reserve prices (Remark 1).
19 Writing "t j < . . . " instead of "t j ≤ . . . ", we deviate from Myerson's original definition while retaining optimality for the seller. 20 For all i ∈ N , we extend c i to
footnote 9.
From Myerson' construction, c i (t i ) ≤ t i and c i (t j ) ≤t j . Hence, (30) and (31) 
yield (8).
Proof of Lemma 2. For any x, the function φ(x, t) := δw 1 (t, J * x )−t is Lipschitz continuous in t, where the Lipschitz constant is independent of x by (2). By (6), for any t the function φ(x, t) is continuous in x. Hence, φ is continuous. By (5), φ(0, 0) > 0. Moreover, φ(t, t) ≤ 0 for all t ≥ t * . Hence, φ(τ * , τ * ) = 0 and τ * > 0.
To prove (10) and (11) if δ < 1, observe that (2) together with q 1 (s, J * τ * ) ≤ 1 (s ∈ T 1 ) implies that φ(τ * , t) is weakly decreasing in t.
To prove the limit result (12), consider the correspondence
Because φ is continuous, ψ is upper-hemicontinuous. From (5),
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, τ * > 0. Hence, (3)-(4) implies l i1 (t * , J * τ * ) < t * , so (13) implies 0 < b * i . By (13), the remaining claim b * i < t * is implied by the claim l i1 (t * , J * τ * ) > 0, which we establish now. Suppose that l i1 (t Proof of Proposition 1. We begin with a complete description of period-1 beliefs and period-2 beliefs. For any i ∈ N and p ≥ 0, let H a i,p denote the set of histories with current price p (= auction price if the history is terminal) where bidder i is active; let H d i,p denote the set of histories where bidder i has dropped out at price p (while the current price is ≥ p).
Observe that, for any i ∈ N , these sets cover the set of all histories:
Hence, to describe the equilibrium period-1 belief profile (A h ) h∈H , it is sufficient to specify, for all i ∈ N , p ≥ 0, and h ∈ H Let i ∈ N . At the initial history h 0 , all bidders are active and A h 0 ,i = F i . Table 2 provides information on period-1 beliefs about bidder i at any history where bidder i has dropped out at price p. Table 2 : Period-1 beliefs about bidder i at any history where bidder i has dropped out. Table 3 provides information on period-1 beliefs about bidder i at any non-initial history where bidder i is active. LetĤ denote the set of histories such that bidder 1 is active while, according to β 1 , she would not be active if her type were ≤ τ * . Table 3 : Period-1 beliefs about bidder i at any non-initial history where bidder i is active.
Equilibrium condition (b) can be verified in a straightforward manner using (14), (15), Table 2 and Table 3 . For example, if bidder 2 drops out at the initial history h 0 , then (15) implies the period-1 belief [0, t * ]. The event that she drops out at a price in (0, t * ] has probability 0; hence, Bayes rule allows an arbitrary period-1 belief such as [0, t * ].
Next we specify period-2 beliefs for any terminal history h ∈ H term . Let ω(h) ∈ N denote the winner at the terminal history h. Period-2 beliefs about losing bidders are identical to the beliefs at the end of the auction, because the decision whether to offer the good for resale is not made by the losing bidders.
G h,i = A h,i for all h ∈ H term and i = ω(h).
In the no-discounting case δ = 1, the same equation G h,i = A h,i is assumed for the winner i = ω(h), and γ h (t i ) = resale, so that equilibrium conditions (c) and (d) are clearly satisfied.
Suppose that δ < 1. Consider a terminal history h where any bidder i ≥ 2 wins at a
As in the proof of Lemma 2, there exists τ h ∈ (0, t * ) such that
Table 4 specifies, for any δ < 1, information on the period-2 beliefs about the period-1 winner (non-zero probability types) and the resale decision profile, where h is any history Table 4 : Period-2 beliefs about the period-1 winner and the resale decision profile.
Equilibrium condition (d) can be verified using To verify equilibrium condition (d) for the row with "any belief", observe that by the second row of Table 2 losing bidders are believed to have types ≤ p, and by the second row of Table 3 the winner is believed to have a type ≥ p. Because none of the winning types chooses "resale", Bayes rule allows for any belief.
To verify equilibrium condition (d) for the next row, observe that either γ h (t i ) = resale or γ h (t i ) = consume. In the "resale" case, G h,i = {t i } follows from A h,i = {t i } (the third row of Table 3 ) by Bayes rule. In the "consume" case, the event that bidder i offers resale has probability 0, so Bayes rule allows for any period-2 belief.
To verify equilibrium condition (d) for the last row of Table 4 , we distinguish two cases.
, then the event that bidder 1 chooses "resale" has probability 0, so Bayes rule allows for any belief, such as
The proof of equilibrium condition (c) for the first two rows of Table 4 is analogous to the corresponding argument in the proof of Lemma 2. To verify equilibrium condition (c)
for the row with "any belief", observe that type p of the winner strictly prefers "consume" because δ < 1 and the highest type among the losing bidders is ≤ p by Table 2 . The exact value of the optimal cutoff type x in this row and the next one plays no role. Equilibrium condition (c) for the last row of Table 4 follows from Lemma 2.
Equilibrium condition (a) follows by construction of the Myerson optimal auction outcome because all beliefs in Table 4 belong to J .
To verify equilibrium condition (e), write b h,i,t i b if at history h the expected payoff of type t i of bidder i when she bids b is not smaller than when she bids b, given that other bidders stick to their candidate equilibrium strategies from h onwards, and bidder i sticks to her candidate equilibrium strategy after additional bidders drop out. We write b h,i,t i b if b h,i,t i b and b h,i,t i b . We will sometimes omit the lower indices.
First we consider bidder-1 types above the threshold t * ,
We prove (32) for the initial history h = h 0 ; other histories are treated similarly. Fix b ≥ 0.
One of the events I-IV occurs; in each event, the payoff from bid t 1 is not lower than from bid b.
Event I: "some bidder = 1 bids < min{b, t 1 }." Then the bid b leads to the same ending history (thus, same payoff) as the bid t 1 because bidder 1's bid at the initial history h 0 becomes irrelevant.
Event II: "all bidders = 1 bid > b." Then the highest type among the bidders = 1 is some t > max{b, t * }. With discounting (δ < 1), the bid b yields the payoff 0 because by Table 4 the winner consumes the good. Without discounting (δ = 1), the good is offered for resale, but the bidders' period-2 payoffs add up to at most max{t 1 , t } (= the highest type among all bidders), and the winner obtains a period-2 payoff of ≥ t by (3), implying that bidder 1 obtains from bid b a payoff of ≤ max{t 1 − t , 0} by (4). But the bid t 1 yields a payoff equal to max{t 1 − t , 0} because bidder 1 pays t if she wins. Hence, t 1 is weakly better than b.
Event III: "all bidders = 1 bid > min{b, t 1 }, and the first dropping out of a bidder = 1 occurs at a price t ≤ b." Then t 1 < b. Hence, t 1 < t ≤ b and the highest type among the bidders = 1 is t > t * . The bid b of bidder 1 becomes irrelevant once the current price t is reached because a bidder has dropped out. Either bidder 1 wins at price t or, given her candidate equilibrium strategy (14), she drops out at price t . In both cases, payoffs are bounded due to (3) and (4). If she wins, then the bidders' period-2 payoffs add up to at most t , hence bidder 1's payoff is ≤ 0 due to the auction price t . If she loses at price t , then her payoff is 0. In any case, the bid b yields a payoff ≤ 0 so that the bid t 1 is weakly better.
Event IV: "at least one bidder = 1 bids min{b, t 1 }, and all others bid more." The probability of IV is positive (and hence IV is payoff-relevant) only if b = 0. If all bidders = 1 bid 0, then bidder 1's type t 1 ≥ t * is the highest among all bidders, implying that bidder 1's payoff from the bid b = 0 is ≤ t 1 (whether or not she wins the tie at 0), so that the bid t 1 , which yields payoff t 1 , is weakly better. If some bidders = 1 bid more than 0, then the highest type among bidders = 1 is some t > t * , implying that bidder 1's payoff from bid 0 is ≤ max{t 1 − t , 0} by (3) and (4), while her payoff from bid t 1 equals max{t 1 − t , 0}. This completes the proof of (32).
For bidder-1 types below the threshold any bid between 0 and the threshold is optimal,
The proof of (33) uses similar arguments as the proof of (32). The only essentially new aspects are that the proof of b 0 uses the property (7), and that bidder 1 is indifferent in the range (0, t * ] where no other bidder is expected to drop out. We omit the details.
Turning to the non-designated bidder-types above the threshold, observe that valuebidding is at least as good as any bid above the designated bidder's competing bid,
The proof of (34) uses similar arguments as the proof of (32). One defines events I'-IV'
analogous to I-IV, with bidder 1 replaced by bidder i, and t 1 replaced by t i . One of the events I'-IV' occurs; in each event, the payoff from bid t i is not lower than from bid b.
The only essentially new aspect is that Event IV' has positive probability (and, hence, is payoff-relevant) only if b = t * and δ < 1, in which case bidder 1 bids t * . Consider Event IV'.
Suppose that n = 2. Then the bid b = t * ends the auction with a tie between bidder 1 and bidder i = 2. If bidder 1 wins the tie, then by Table 2 and Table 4 bidder 1 consumes the good so that bidder i obtains the payoff 0; if bidder i wins the tie, then she obtains t i − t * .
In any case, the bid t i is weakly better than b. Suppose that n > 2. Then bidder i loses with bid b and obtains the payoff 0, so that the bid t i is weakly better. This completes the proof of (34).
For non-designated-bidder types below the threshold, any bid between the designated bidder's competing bid and t * is at least as good as any bid above t * ,
To prove (35), first consider the initial history h = h 0 . If at least one bidder = i has a type above t * , bidder i obtains payoff 0 with any b. Otherwise all bidders = i have types below t * .
If n > 2, then some bidder drops out at price 0, so that bidder i's bid at the initial history becomes irrelevant and any b > 0 leads to the same ending history. Suppose that n = 2. If t 1 ≤ τ * , then bidder 1 drops out at price b * i , which ends the auction, so that all b lead to the same ending history. If t 1 > τ * , then bidder 1 drops out at price t * and bidder i obtains payoff 0 with any b. Arguments are similar for h = h 0 . This completes the proof of (35).
For non-designated-bidder types above the threshold, value-bidding is at least as good as any bid below the designated bidder's competing bid,
We prove (36) at h = h 0 (other histories are treated similarly). Also, we do not consider the bid b = b * i ; its treatment combines the arguments used to prove (34) with the arguments below, depending on whether or not bidder i wins the tie against bidder 1.
Suppose first that n = 2. One of the events V-VII occurs; in each event, the payoff from bid t i is not lower than from bid b.
Event V: "bidder 1 bids b * 2 ." Then with bid t i bidder i wins at price b * 2 , the period-2 belief is J * τ * , and bidder i's payoff is
With any bid b < b * i , bidder i loses, the period-2 belief is J * τ * , and her payoff is
Hence, the bid t i is weakly better.
Event VI: "bidder 1 bids t * ." This event has positive probability only if δ < 1, in which case bidder 1 consumes the good if she wins, so that any bid b < b * i yields the bidder-i payoff 0. But the bid t i yields the payoff t i − t * ≥ 0.
Event VII: "bidder 1 bids > t * ." Then the proof that t i is weakly better than any bid b < b * i uses similar arguments as the proof of (32). Now suppose that n ≥ 3. Consider first the bid b = 0. If all bidders ∈ {1, i} bid 0, then the proof that bid t i is weakly better is analogous to the treatment of Event V. If some bidder ∈ {1, i} does not bid 0, then this bidder bids more than t * and this case is analogous to the treatment of Event VII. Now consider bids b > 0. If some bidder ∈ {1, i} bids 0, then all bids b > 0 (in particular, the bid t i ) yield the same ending history and hence same payoff (because the initial-history bid becomes irrelevant). Otherwise all bidders ∈ {1, i} bid > t * , so that any bid b < b * i yields the payoff 0 and the bid t i is weakly better (similar arguments as in the proof of (32)). This completes the proof of (36).
For non-designated-bidder types below the threshold, the bid 0 is at least as good as any bid below the designated bidder's competing bid,
To prove (37), observe that the bid 0 yields the same period-2 belief as any bid b < b * i in any event, and bidder i always loses the auction. Hence, payoffs are the same.
Finally, for non-designated-bidder types below the threshold, the bid 0 is at least as good as any bid between the designated bidder's competing bid and t * ,
We prove (38) at h = h 0 (other histories are treated similarly). Also, we do not consider the bid b = b * i ; its treatment combines the arguments used to prove (37) with the arguments below, depending on whether or not bidder i wins the tie against bidder 1.
Suppose first that n = 2. One of the events V-VII defined above occurs; in each event, the payoff from bid t i is not lower than from bid b.
Suppose Event V occurs. Then with bid b bidder i wins at price b * 2 , the period-2 belief is J * τ * , and bidder i's payoff iŝ
With bid 0, bidder i loses, the period-2 belief is J * τ * , and her payoff is
Observe thatÛ
From (1), U * i is Lipschitz continuous and hence is differentiable almost everywhere, and the derivative is
Similarly, the derivative ofÛ i isÛ
Hence,
Hence, the bid 0 is weakly better.
If Event VI or Event VII occurs, bidder i's payoff is 0 with either bid 0 or any
Now suppose that n ≥ 3. If all bidders ∈ {1, i} bid 0, then the proof that bid 0 is weakly better than b ∈ (b * i , t * ] is analogous to the treatment of Event V. If some bidder ∈ {1, i} does not bid 0, then bidder i's payoff is 0 anyway.
Proof of Lemma 5. If δ = 1, the result is obvious because τ * i = t i . Let δ < 1 and let
Let i = 1 (the proof is analogous for other bidders). From (17), F 2 (t * /2)/F 2 (t * ) → 1/2 as t * → 0. Hence, for all t * sufficiently close to 0,
A lower bound for the period-2 payoff of any type x ≤ θt * of bidder 1 is the payoff from a take-it-or-leave-it fixed-price offer at t * /2 to bidder 2,
Therefore, for all x ≤ θt * ,
Proof of Lemma 6. For any threshold t * , i ∈ N , and
Step 1. If t * is sufficiently close to 0, then V i is strictly increasing.
To show this, consider any t, t such that 0 ≤ t < t ≤ t * . Then
where L is a Lipschitz constant for f i .
Let t * be so close to 0 that (42) implies
The right-hand side is strictly positive if t * < f i (0)/8L, showing that V i is strictly increasing.
The next step is to provide lower bounds for the virtual valuation functions V i (i ∈ N ) if t * is small. To this end, define
Observe that κ i (t * ) → 1 as t * → 0. Hence, if t * is small, the lower bound established in Step
Step 2. For all i ∈ N , t ∈ [0, t * ], and any threshold t * ,
Using (17) and (41),
Observe that (17) implies
The next step is to provide formulas for period-2-buyer allocation probabilities. From now on, suppose that t * is sufficiently close to 0 so that the conclusion of Step 1 holds.
Step 3. For any j ∈ N , i ∈ N \ {j}, and
According to the Myerson optimal auction outcome given the period-2 seller j ∈ N and the belief J * j , the good is assigned to the buyer with the highest virtual valuation, unless j's use value is higher (cf. Myerson, 1981) . From this the allocation probabilities (46) are straightforward.
Step 4. Proof of (22).
Define ξ = 4/5. Using Step 2, for any i ∈ N ,
Hence, V i (ξt * )/t * → 3/5 as t * → 0. Thus, using
Step 1, if t * is sufficiently close to 0,
Using (46), for any j = i, if δ < 1,
we can choose any < 1/2 n−1 .
Proof of Lemma 7. Using the envelope theorem,
Let > 0. If t * is sufficiently small, then |h 1 (x)| ≤ x n−1 for all x ≤ t * . Therefore
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 8. First let δ < 1. Let ξ < θ and > 0 be so close to 0 that
Because probabilities add up to 1,
Using Lemma 5, lim inf
It is well-known that the incentive compatibility constraints for period 2 imply that (*) the functions q j (·, J * j ) are weakly increasing. We find
≤ lim inf
≤ 1 − lim inf
Dividing both sides by 1 − ξ/θ yields (23). Now let δ = 1. Define ξ < 1 and > 0 as in (48) with θ = 1. Using (3) and (4), q j (t j , J * j ) = 1 for all t j > t * . Hence, because τ * j = t j and probabilities sum up to 1,
Rearranging yields
Similar to the cases δ < 1, we obtain (23) because
= lim sup
Proof of Lemma 9. If t i < ξt * , the claim U b ij (t i ) ≥ 0 is immediate from (4). Let t i > ξt * .
Using (1) and
which together with Lemma 5 implies the claim. If δ = 1, similar arguments imply
Proof of Lemma 10. If t i > ξt * , the claim U s i (t i ) ≥ t i is immediate from equilibrium condition (c). Let t i ≤ ξt * . First let δ < 1. Then t i < θt * ≤ τ * i by Lemma 5. Using (2) and the fact that δw i (τ
as was to be shown. If δ = 1, then the claim follows from analogous arguments with τ * i replaced by t * .
Appendix B
We wish to show that the strategies used in t * -equilibria are undominated. To do so we utilize the "type-player interpretation" of the auction-with-resale game, where different types of a bidder represent different players (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 26) . 22 A pure strategy s for type t i ∈ T i of bidder i is undominated if, for any strategy s = s, either s yields the same (expected) payoff as s no matter what other bidders do, or (*) there exists a profile of strategies s −i for the bidders other than i such that s yields a strictly higher payoff than s against s −i .
Assume that there are n = 2 bidders, so that the period-2 seller makes a fixed-price takeit-or-leave-it offer according to the Myerson optimal auction outcome; at the end of this section we comment on the extension of the arguments to environments with n ≥ 3 bidders.
A pure strategy s for type t i of bidder i is described by a bid β i (t i ) and a resale price function r i (t i , ·), where r i (t i , p) ∈ [0, ∞) ∪ {consume} denotes her resale price or consumption decision when she wins the auction at price p. The domain of the function r i can be restricted to the set {(t i , p) | t i ∈ [0, t i ], p ∈ [0, β i (t i )]}. 23 Any resale price is accepted by all losing-bidder types greater than or equal to this price.
22 This corresponds to the natural viewpoint that the bidders select their strategies after they have learned their private information. 23 We do not have to specify a bidder's resale price if she wins at a price higher than her bid, because different prices yield equivalent strategies. 
Proposition 4 shows that pure strategies satisfying (52) are undominated, except possibly for 0-type bidders. 25 The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that a strategy of any type of bidder i that involves a bid b cannot be weakly dominated by an alternative strategy where the bidder submits a bid = b. This is true because assuming the other bidder bids so aggressively that bidder i must wait for a resale offer, it may be the case that a favorable resale offer is made only if bidder −i wins at price b, making the bid b uniquely optimal. In the second step we show that a strategy of any type of bidder i that involves a bid b and a certain resale price x = consume if the bidder wins at a given price p ≤ b cannot be weakly dominated by a strategy where bidder i sticks to the bid b, but changes her resale behavior upon winning at p. Here we use the assumption that bidder −i's valuation density is positive at x. Indeed, if, for some small > 0, types [x, x + ] of bidder −i bid p and all other types bid more than b, then it is uniquely optimal to offer resale at price x upon winning at p (and the resale decisions when winning at a price = p are irrelevant). The argument is slightly different if x = consume.
Proposition 4 Let n = 2. For all types t i = 0 of all bidders i, any pure strategy satisfying (52) is undominated.
Proof. Consider any pure strategy s for type t i of bidder i consisting of a bid b and a resale price function r i (t i , ·). Let V (b) denote the set of all (pure or mixed) strategies of type t i of bidder i where she bids b with certainty.
24 If δ = 1 and t i ≥ t −i , all resale prices ≥ t i yield the same payoff as "consume", so we can as well fix the price at t i . Otherwise, any strategy not satisfying (52) is dominated. If δ < 1, any price ≤ t i /δ is no better, and sometimes worse, than consuming the good. If δ = 1, any price ≤ t i is no better, and sometimes worse, than any price in (t i , t −i ). Any price ≥ t −i will be accepted with probability 0 from an ex-ante viewpoint. 25 The 0-types' t * -equilibrium strategies are in fact dominated. Each 0-type bidder may switch to any undominated strategy at the cost of complicating the definition of t * -equilibria and leaving the rest of the analysis unchanged because the 0 types occur with probability 0.
Step 1. (*) holds if s ∈ V (b).
Define strategies s −i = (β −i (t −i ), r −i (t −i , ·)) for the various types t −i ∈ T −i of bidder −i as follows. Bidder −i of type t −i bids β −i (t −i ) > max{b, t −i }. If she wins at any price p = b, then she chooses a resale price r −i (t −i , p) optimally given the belief that bidder i's type is in Given any p ≤ b, let W (p, b) denote the set of all (pure or mixed) strategies where type t i of bidder i chooses the resale price r i (t i , p) with certainty when she wins at price p.
Step 2. (*) holds if s ∈ V (b) \ W (p, b).
First assume that r i (t i , p) =: x = consume. Observe that t i < t −i by (52). Define strategies s −i = (β −i (t −i ), r −i (t −i , ·)) such that β −i (t −i ) = p if t −i ∈ [x, x+ ], and β −i (t −i ) > b otherwise, where > 0 is chosen so small that
Resale prices r −i (t −i , ·) are arbitrary. Against s −i , if type t i of bidder i wins at price p, then the resale price x is uniquely optimal for her (her period-2 payoff from resale price y is strictly decreasing for y ∈ [x, x + ], which can be seen by computing the derivative of the payoff and using (53)). Because the price x > t i /δ is accepted with certainty, it is also better than "consume". Hence, s is strictly better than any s . Now assume that r i (t i , p) = consume. Define strategies s −i = (β −i (t −i ), r −i (t −i , ·)) such that β −i (t −i ) = p if t −i ∈ [0, ], and β −i (t −i ) > b otherwise, where < t i . Resale prices r −i (t −i , ·) are arbitrary. If type t i of bidder i wins at price p against s −i , then "consume" is better than offering resale. Hence, s is strictly better than any s . This completes Step 2.
Step 1 and
Step 2 show that s is undominated because
Now consider environments with n ≥ 3 bidders. The crucial complication in extending Proposition 4 occurs in Step 1 of the proof. Below we outline a proof that strategies that involve arbitrary bid functions are undominated, so long as the resale behavior is appropriately restricted in a manner similar to (52).
Any type of a given bidder must choose a planned dropout price (bid) at each history during the English auction. First one shows that a strategy that involves some bid b at the initial history cannot be weakly dominated by a strategy that involves a bid = b at the initial history. The resale mechanisms involved in this argument are second-price auctions with reserve prices similar to the resale prices used in the 2-bidder proof. Next, a strategy that involves a bid b at the initial history and a bid b at the history h reached when a certain bidder drops out at a certain price cannot be dominated by a strategy where she submits the bid b at the initial history and a bid = b at h ; to show this, one constructs strategies of the other bidders such that history h is reached and then, as before, the remaining active rivals bid so aggressively that the bidder must wait for a resale offer. Continuing inductively to the end of the auction, one sees that a strategy cannot be dominated by any strategy that involves a bidding structure different from the one used in the original strategy.
27 Observe that, for the verification of (*) in steps 1 and 2, the strategy profile s −i can itself be taken to be a profile of strategies satisfying (52). In this sense, any pure strategy satisfying (52) survives any iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
